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Health Care Reform Issue Paper
Ethical Issues in the Drug Approval Process
“I’m disappointed the commissioner has chosen to take the hardest line possible . . . for some
women, the decision was nothing short of a death sentence”
- Terrence D. Kalley, husband of woman taking Avastin. The New York Times (Pollack 2011)

“It is the right decision for women and for science. We all wished the drug worked. It does not”
- Frances M. Visco, president of the National Breast Cancer Coalition. The New York Times (Pollack 2011)

Americans have been led to believe that a pill can cure everything and anything. Any
pain, discomfort, affliction, or allergy can be fixed or alleviated with one small tablet. What
happened to “An apple a day keeps the doctor away”? Today, Americans want to see their
doctors in order to receive prescriptions for drugs. With so many drugs on the market it is
important to pay attention to how these drugs are being produced and the regulated trials they
must undergo before they can be released to the public. Clinical trial research is used in order to
test the safety and efficacy of new medical treatments. By nature, clinical trial research involves
human subjects, which means that ethical issues will always exist. One of the current ethical
debates surrounding the drug approval process is the growing tension between making sure drugs
are safe and the speed at which drugs can be sent to market. Proponents of safety argue that drug
approval is not something that should be rushed, while proponents of speed argue that the faster
drugs make it to market, the more lives that will be saved because people can actually use them.
The case studies of Vioxx and Avastin illustrate the ethical and practical dilemmas in the drug
approval process. I argue that new drugs for terminally ill patients, for which no better known
treatment exists, should be made available to those patients as quickly as possible, including
using streamlined approval, provided that patients are made clearly aware of the difference
between research and treatment.

	
  

1	
  

The Origins of Expedited Review
The age of expedited development and accelerated approval of new drugs began in the
1980s as a reaction to the emerging AIDS epidemic. Before this time, as mandated by the 1962
amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), all new drug applications
had to undergo three phases of clinical trials and had to be approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). It was estimated that this process took an average of eight years to
complete and cost more than 50 million dollars per drug (Greenburg). While the new drug
approval process was time consuming and costly, the 1962 amendments were welcomed at the
time because of concerns about thalidomide. Thalidomide was a drug that a German
pharmaceutical company had marketed as a sleeping pill, but was later found to be associated
with the birth of thousands of malformed babies in Western Europe (Promoting Safe and
Effective Drugs for 100 Years 2006). Although the Medical Officer of the FDA had fortunately
kept thalidomide off the U.S. market, the American public was eager to support stricter
regulations on pharmaceutical companies. When the AIDS epidemic began to grow, becoming
the leading cause of death for U.S. men ages 25-44 in 1992, FDA regulations designed to protect
patients, by properly evaluating risks and ensuring that new drugs were safe before they were
released to the public, became seen as a hindrance to progress and a suppression of patient
autonomy (Anderson 2011). The ethics of the entire drug approval process became very different
when patients, such as those with AIDS, were terminally ill: “Terminally ill patients lacking
effective conventional treatments confront a risk-benefit determination very different from that
of the general public. Such patients have far greater incentives than the larger public to gather
their own information and to take risks” (Greensburg). AIDS patients utilized these incentives
and began to organize. Organizations, including the Gay Men’s Health Crisis started in 1982,
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and the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) established in 1987, led protests and
demonstrations in order to pressure the FDA into changing its policies. In response to this
pressure, the FDA adopted many new drug approval reform measures, including “Treatment IND
(Investigational New Drug)” and “Accelerated Approval” regulations. “Treatment IND”
regulations, promulgated in 1987, made experimental drugs available to patients, physicians and
manufacturers when certain conditions were met, including that the drug was designed to treat a
serious or life threatening condition and no other treatment options existed (Greenburg).
“Accelerated Approval” regulations, instituted in 1993, built on previous “Subpart E”
regulations, which enabled early and constant collaboration between the FDA and a
pharmaceutical company developing a life saving drug so that Phase III Trials could be bypassed
if enough information was gathered. The “Accelerated Approval” regulations allowed “surrogate
endpoints”, or intermediate biochemical effects of a new drug, to be used as a final basis for
FDA approval, provided that post-marketing studies were pursued to ensure effectiveness and
safety (Greensburg). Therefore, life saving drugs can be approved for treatment based on one
clinical effect. In 1997, Congress codified the FDA’s accelerated approval regulations by
enacting Section 506 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Decision of the
Commissioner 2011).
The ramifications of these new regulations were far reaching, affecting far more than just
the AIDS population. They opened the door for further debate about whether or not the FDA
regulations expedited the approval process too much, compromising patient safety, or whether
the regulations should be stricter in ensuring patient safety is met prior to sales. The two drugs
that will be described in this paper serve as tangible examples of this controversy. Vioxx, a painreliever for arthritis approved by the FDA in 1999, was pulled from the market five years after
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being released because it was shown to cause an increased risk of serious cardiovascular events.
Avastin, a drug used to treat several types of cancers, was granted accelerated approval by the
FDA in 2008, under the regulations developed in 1993, to treat metastatic breast cancer, but later
had this early approval revoked. Both cases highlight the pros and cons of the expedited approval
process, which will be discussed in greater detail in the rest of the paper. The Vioxx recall
highlights (1) the ethics of clinical trial research itself, (2) the evaluation of risks versus benefits
of any new treatment, (3) the growth of Contract Research Organizations (CROs) and (4) the
ethics of post-marketing research. The Avastin story contrasts the lessons learned from the Vioxx
recall, specifically the evaluation of risks versus benefits. I use these contrasting issues to support
my argument that expedited approval is ethical and should be used to get drugs to terminally ill
patients as quickly as possible, provided that patients are made clearly aware of the difference
between research and treatment.
Vioxx
Merck is a successful global pharmaceutical entity that has much experience in the field
of drug development. In 2009, Merck was ranked second of the top fifteen Global Pharma
Corporations, falling only behind Pfizer (Pharma and Biotech Industry Global Report). By May
of 1999, Merck had successfully completed the development, testing and proper marketing of a
new drug to treat arthritis pain, Vioxx. Vioxx was an important drug for Merck because it was to
compete with Celebrex, Pfizer’s new drug to treat arthritis pain. Additionally, the Vioxx sales
came at a pivotal time for Merck because patents to four of their major drugs were scheduled to
expire in 2000 and 2001, meaning that generic equivalents would be allowed to enter the market
and consequently depreciate Merck’s sales (Presley). Vioxx “was crucial for Merck’s bottom
line – the high-margin blockbuster prescription drug contributed a fifth of Merck’s profits in

	
  

4	
  

2003” (Oberholzer-Gee 2004). On May 20, 1999, the FDA approved Merck’s application for
Vioxx to be brought to market (Presley). As soon as Vioxx was released, it was an instant
success: “By the end of 1999, over 5 million prescriptions had been written for Vioxx and it had
been launched in 47 countries” (Presley). This was more than 22,000 prescriptions per day and
was mainly because Merck successfully marketed Vioxx to physicians (Presley). Merck desired
to market Vioxx so heavily because the population was aging and the arthritis market was
booming. In 1999, analysts expected the market for prescription arthritis drugs to rise from $7.2
billion worldwide to $13 billion by 2005 (Morrow 1999). Despite gaining FDA approval and
huge economic success, Merck continued to test Vioxx in post-marketing studies during and
after its release to see if it had other uses. These post-marketing studies eventually came to
highlight serious health concerns that would lead to Merck pulling Vioxx from the market.
In January of 1999, just months before Vioxx received FDA approval, Merck began a set
of clinical trials known as VIGOR (Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research) to test the
efficacy and safety of Vioxx compared to its top competitor, Aleve. The goal of the VIGOR
trials was to compare the gastrointestinal outcomes of patients taking Vioxx (Group A) versus
those in patients taking Aleve, generically known as naxopren (Group B) (Presley). Merck was
not forced to pursue these trials, but chose to perform them because the FDA had the power to
approve what the contents of the Vioxx label. “Although the FDA has limited power to compel
firms to conduct post-marketing studies, it must approve the labeling for drugs, and it has the
authority to issue a public health advisory or even recall a product with adverse effects from the
market, giving it some leverage with manufacturers” (Eisenburg 2005). Merck opposed a study
that focused solely on cardiovascular risks, but decided “in consultation with the FDA, to
monitor data on these risks in ongoing studies of new indications, thereby signaling optimism
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about new markets rather than concern about side effects” (Eisenburg 2005). Merck was not
alone in conducting post-marketing research, but post-marketing studies are more common now
than they were in 1999 due to federal legislation passed in 2007 that strengthened the authority
of the FDA in the post-marketing period. Merck’s VIGOR trial involved 8,000 participants and
was monitored by a Data Safety and Monitoring Board (DSMB) (Presley). The DSMB noticed
an increased number of serious cardiovascular events in Group A than Group B, 52 compared to
29, but they did not know originally whether this was because Group A had received a negative
side effect or Group B had received a protective side effect. The DSMB requested additional
safety analysis reports on the cardiovascular events that had occurred before the study was to be
published. However, these safety concerns were pushed aside by top Merck officials who were
more concerned with their stakeholders and the fact that Vioxx was their top selling product. For
example, the President of Merck Research Laboratories, admitted that “safety risks were evident,
but he hoped that Merck could present the risks as a class effect, or, in other words, present the
risks so that they appeared common to all drugs that function as COX-2 inhibitors” (Presley).
Merck was not willing to let one set of trials dictate the future of Vioxx without putting up a
fight.
Before the results of the VIGOR trials were even published, Merck’s Marketing and
Sales team published a statement claiming that the main results of the study were that Vioxx
produced a significant reduction of serious gastrointestinal events compared to Aleve,
generically known as naproxen, in patients being treated for rheumatoid arthritis (Presley). The
statement tried to avoid any concern about increased risk of serious cardiovascular events in
patients taking Vioxx by attributing the increase to a health benefit received in patients taking
Aleve: “In addition, significantly fewer thromboembolic events were observed in patients taking
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naproxen in this GI outcomes study, which is consistent with naproxen’s ability to block platelet
aggregation” (Presley). Merck attempted to attribute Vioxx’s inability to block platelet
aggregation as an effect common to all COX-2 inhibitor drugs, even before the study results
were released to the public. On November 23, 2000, the results published in the New England
Journal of Medicine showed that patients taking Vioxx were five times more likely to experience
an adverse cardiovascular event than patients taking Aleve (Presley). The Marketing and Sales
team continued to be relentless in trying to divert attention and keep the media from catching on
to the story. For example, they created a reference manual for all their field representatives to
follow that included a list of tough questions physicians might ask about the study results and a
set of talking points they could respond with. Even after an FDA committee and a New York
Times article noted the increased risks of cardiovascular events and questioned the safety of
Vioxx, Merck continued to stick to its original conclusion that it was due to a protective effect of
naxopren and that Vioxx was still more advantageous than narcotics for pain management.
Safety concerns continued to grow however, and eventually Merck was forced to make a
decision. Merck had continued to test Vioxx in clinical trials for its effects on Alzheimer’s
disease and colon polyps. However, these studies also revealed safety concerns associated with
Vioxx. Merck requested an emergency meeting with the FDA on September 28, 2004 to share
the data gained from these additional studies. In collaboration with the FDA, on September 30,
2004, almost five years after the original safety concerns had first emerged, Merck decided to
pull Vioxx from the market (Presley).
The fact that Merck knew all along about the increased risk of serious cardiovascular
events in patients taking Vioxx, but continued to sweep the information to the side as they
promoted their blockbuster drug, shows that FDA regulation is necessary. If the FDA had not

	
  

7	
  

been regulating Merck, they would have continued to market Vioxx worldwide in attempts to
increase their bottom-line, despite the adverse side effects to patients. The expedited approval
process should be used to bring drugs to market as quickly as possible, as long as appropriate
regulations, which keep pharmaceutical companies in check, are in place.
Effects of the Vioxx Recall: Clinical Trial Research
The Vioxx recall raises several issues about the drug approval process. The first issue is
whether or not clinical trial research itself is ethical. The use of randomized trials began in the
early 1950s when streptomycin was evaluated in patients with tuberculosis (Passamani 1991).
Since then, the process of clinical trials has been greatly revised and refined. In an article in The
New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Passamini, a doctor from the National, Heart and Lung
Institute, makes a strong case that clinical trials are the most scientifically and ethically sound
way to test new drugs (Passamani 1991). He argues that randomized trials, as compared to
observational studies or a trust in common sense, are the most effective way to prove the safety
and efficacy of a new drug. He believes that in order to be ethical, clinical trials need to obtain
informed consent from all patients, give patients the ability to end the study at any time and
make the patients clearly aware that they are part of an experiment. Additionally, a state of
clinical equipoise must also exist. This occurs when “a community of competent physicians
would be content to have their patients pursue any of the treatment strategies being tested in a
randomized trial, since none of them has been clearly established as preferable” (Passamani
1991). In the case of the VIGOR trial, neither Vioxx nor Aleve had been shown to be preferable
for treatment of gastrointestinal issues. Physicians could rightfully and ethically recommend their
patients take part in this trial because the benefits would outweigh the risks, especially since
neither group would be receiving a placebo. Passamani notes that one of the common
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counterarguments is that clinical trials are not ethical because physicians sacrifice the interests of
their current patients to the interests of all future patients when they ask patients to participate in
a clinical trial. Passamani argues that this perspective is wrong because in recommending a
clinical trial as treatment, physicians rightfully weigh the evidence of known therapies versus the
data that exists about the possibility of new treatments. When treatments have not shown to be
preferable, it is not unethical to have patients participate in clinical trials in order to assess their
efficacy. For terminally ill patients, this becomes an even stronger argument. Terminally ill
patients have a greater incentive to participate in clinical trials because it may be the only
treatment option they have. The clinical trial research process should be expedited for drugs
designed to treat terminally ill patients with no other research options.
Effects of the Vioxx Recall: Evaluation of Risks vs. Benefits
Although Passamani demonstrates that the concept of clinical trial research is ethical, the
Vioxx recall raises ethical issues that Passamani fails to consider. For example, Passamani does
not consider the question of what should be done with the information gained from a trial after
the trial is completed. In the VIGOR trial, 52 cases of serious cardiovascular events were found
in the group taking Vioxx. The issue becomes not whether that information was gained ethically,
but how that information should be interpreted and used in an ethical manner. Is the risk of
developing a serious cardiovascular event enough to outweigh the benefits of pain and
gastrointestinal relief? Vioxx was shown to cause increased risk of cardiovascular events among
certain older patients, but successfully reduced pain due to arthritis in many others. While the
relative risk for having a heart attack was higher among patients taking Vioxx versus those
taking Aleve, 0.4% compared to 0.1%, the absolute risk remained how. However, “because tens
of millions of people in more than 80 countries took Vioxx, this small risk translated into an
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important public health issue” (Greener 2008). It remains up for debate whether Vioxx should
have been pulled from the market. Mark Pauly, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania,
believes that the Vioxx recall highlights “the inherent tradeoff between the health benefits of
taking any drug and the risk of side effects” (Vioxx and Other Painkillers). He makes the point
that the issue with all new drugs is that, “as more people take the drug, more information about
side effects is likely to come out. But as more people take the drug, it grows more important to a
firm's profitability” (Vioxx and Other Painkillers). Vioxx sales reached $2.5 billion in 2003
(Vioxx and Other Painkillers). Millions of people were taking the drug, making it more likely for
adverse side effects to be noticed. Merck had strong incentives not to publicize the information
gained from the VIGOR trial though because it would severely cut into Merck’s sales. However,
just because a drug is shown to have risks of adverse side effects does not necessarily mean it has
to be pulled from the market. Pauly points out that, “If all drugs were pulled from the market
based on the appearance of side effects, there would be no vaccinations for childhood diseases
that once were killers, or for medications to treat HIV/AIDS” (Vioxx and Other Painkillers). All
drugs have side effects and risks associated them. The FDA made the judgment call that the risks
of Vioxx were too severe and outweighed the benefits. While the FDA made an ethical decision
in this case because patients were protected from the risk of serious cardiovascular events and
could simply switch to another arthritis drug, such as Celebrex, it would have been an unethical
decision if it was the only-life saving drug available to terminally ill patients. When patients are
terminally ill the evaluation of risks and benefits changes significantly. As those with AIDS
argued in the 1980s and 1990s, expedited approval should be used for terminally ill patients
because even a small benefit could merit use, despite high risks.
Effects of the Vioxx Recall: CROs
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The latest trend in clinical trial research, and another ethical issue surrounding it, is the
growth of Contract Research Organizations (CROs). The CRO industry emerged in its current
form in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the CRO industry took off in the 1990s, “rising from 4%
of R&D spend in the early 90s, to pushing 50% in the mid 2000s” (Walsh 2010). In 2007, there
were more than 1000 CROs in operation globally and the top four were billion dollar companies
(Schuchman 2007). The top 10 companies control 56% of the market (Walsh 2010). CROs have
surpassed academia in clinical research because they can develop and test new drugs with greater
efficiency. CROs represent one-third of total pharma and biotech spending on drug research and
development (Brooks 2011). However, questions have been raised about the ethics of CROs
because “annual CRO-industry revenues have increased from about $7 billion in 2001 to an
estimated $17.8 billion today” (Schuchman 2007). In 2010, CRO revenue was projected to total
$20 billion (Brooks 2011). Aside from the growing profits, critics are concerned about the speed
at which CROs complete research studies. One argument is that quality suffers when more
emphasis is placed on speed. Pierre Azoulay, an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s Sloan School of Management, describes CROs as “‘data-production sweatshops,’
where ‘everyone’s very focused on the data,’ rather than on the totality of the knowledge
required to determine whether a drug is worth pursuing further, and where ‘all the incentives are
to do [the work] fast’” (Schuchman 2007). However, a study done by Tufts found that CROs still
turned out high-quality research (Schuchman 2007). CROs highlight the major flaws and
strengths of the drug development industry today. While too much emphasis on speed and
deliverables can serve to harm patients and violate ethical standards, when it comes to
developing drugs for diseases that leave patients terminally ill, speed is essential. Because CROs
break the trial process down into manageable concrete steps and emphasize swiftness at each
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step, they are able to produce drugs faster than traditional academic research centers (Schuchman
2007). I believe CROs and their focus on speed need to be utilized for the development of drugs
used to treat terminally ill patients. Terminally ill patients generally have few or no other viable
treatment options. The possibility that a new drug will work, even if it has side effects that are
found later, is enough reason to push drugs through trials as quickly as possible.
CROs also highlight the issue of whether the FDA has stringent enough regulations
within the drug approval process or whether these regulations are more burdensome to the
process than they are helpful. One of the criticisms of CROs stems from the fact that they are not
well regulated by the FDA. Since many of the drug regulations that exist were written in the
1970s before the CRO industry emerged, they do not address CRO accountability (Schuchman
2007). A pharmaceutical company or sponsor hires a CRO to perform clinical trials, increasingly
abroad, so that the company does not need to directly provide staff for and organize the trials.
Therefore, CROs often report any issues found during a trial directly back to the drug company
that hired them, not to the FDA. However, in turn, drug companies do not always report the
issues to the FDA. It is unclear where the responsibility for ethical or safety issues falls in these
cases. Additionally, CROs are even harder to monitor when their trial sites are increasingly being
sent overseas, where research subjects are more available and less costly (Schuchman 2007).
Many argue that CROs should be more heavily regulated, especially since their main focus is on
speed.
Effects of the Vioxx Recall: Post-Marketing Research
The Vioxx recall serves as an example of the necessity of FDA regulations and the
benefits of post-marketing research. While some could argue that the FDA failed to properly
regulate Vioxx because the drug should never have gone to market in the first place, I agree with
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the argument that the Vioxx recall should be viewed as a regulatory success story (Eisenburg
2005). This argument hinges on the fact that drugs resemble information products, such as
databases, more so than other chemicals (Eisenburg 2005). The goal of clinical trial research is
therefore information on the efficacy and safety of the drug. Pharmaceutical companies have
powerful incentives to selectively share the information gathered from clinical trial research.
However, “FDA regulation constrains these impulses by providing oversight of trial design,
scrutiny of results by FDA scientists and outside experts, and assurance that marketing claims
correspond to underlying data” (Eisenburg 2005). In terms of Vioxx, the FDA had limited power
to actually mandate Merck to conduct post-marketing research trials, but Merck was constrained
by regulations on off-label marketing and therefore had to pursue further studies after Vioxx was
already approved for use of arthritis pain. Post-marketing research is valuable in that it can be
used in conjunction with expedited approval. After expedited approval of a new drug, postmarketing research can be to gather further data on the safety and efficacy of the drug or replace
one of the bypassed preliminary trials. In this way, drugs can be brought to market sooner and
the trials will simply be completed after. The Vioxx recall demonstrates that post-marketing
studies are beneficial in that they can find new uses of the drug or find adverse side effects that
may have been missed, overlooked or underplayed before. Additionally, since post-marketing
studies do not slow down the speed of the drug approval process, they can effectively be used to
get drugs to terminally ill patients as quickly as possible.
Final Judgment on the Vioxx Recall
The FDA was justified in their decision to require Merck to recall Vioxx from the market.
Evidence from several clinical trials showed that patients taking Vioxx had an increased risk of
developing a serious cardiovascular event compared to other pain-relievers. Critics argue that
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because these adverse effects were only seen in certain segments of the patient population, the
FDA should simply have required these increased risk factors to be added to the Vioxx label.
However, the FDA based its decision on reliable evidence and did so to protect the population as
a whole. Additionally, since Vioxx is only a pain-reliever and not a life-saving treatment,
following the recall patients could easily switch to a new drug, since there were many others
available on the market. The FDA’s decision to take Vioxx off the market did not prevent
patients from receiving treatment for their condition. Instead, it served to protect the millions of
patients who were taking Vioxx, because the increased risk of serious cardiovascular events was
undeniable. David Graham, Associate Director for Science and Medicine at the FDA’s Office of
Drug Safety, “estimates that Vioxx caused between 88,000 and 138,000 additional heart attacks
or sudden cardiac deaths in the USA, and that 30–40% of patients who suffered cardiovascular
problems because of Vioxx probably died” (Greener 2008). The FDA used its regulating powers
appropriately by recalling Vioxx from the market. In this case, the increased risks were not worth
the benefits. In the case of Avastin, it is a different story.
Avastin
Developed by Genetech, Avastin is an antibody that inhibits the biological activity of a
protein important in the formation of blood vessels. On February 26, 2004, the FDA’s Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) approved Avastin as treatment to be used in combination
with chemotherapy for patients with colon and rectum cancer. On February 2, 2008, CDER
granted accelerated approval to Avastin in combination with paclitaxel as a treatment for patients
who have not received chemotherapy for metastatic HER2-negative breast cancer (Decision of
the Commissioner 2011). Approval was based on the results of E2100, a cooperative group
randomized trial that showed a 5.5-month increase in progression free survival (Carpenter 2011).
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The drug was granted accelerated approval solely on the basis of an increase in progression free
survival because of the high case fatality rate of this type of cancer. Metastatic breast cancer is
currently an incurable disease and over 90% of patients diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer
die from it (Decision of the Commissioner 2011). For incurable diseases, prolongation of life
remains the gold standard for approval of treatments. After FDA approval, Avastin became one
of the top drugs for treating cancer. The breast cancer market totaled $8.6 billion in 2011 and is
estimated to rise steadily to $10.9 billion in 2018 (Growth in the Breast Cancer Drug Market). In
2009, Avastin generated $4.8 billion in annual sales (Herper 2009). Roche, a Swiss
pharmaceutical company, payed $47 million in March of 2009 to buy the part of Genetech that
they did not already own because of its blockbuster drug Avastin. Genentech's projections had
U.S. Avastin sales quadrupling to $10 billion by 2015 (Herper 2009).
However, Avastin sales fell short of this estimation, in part because the FDA revoked its
accelerated approval to treat metastatic breast caner. On November 16, 2009, Genetech
submitted the results of two additional trials, AVADO and RIBBON1, to the FDA in order to
apply for regular approval of Avastin to treat metastatic breast cancer. On the basis of the results
of these confirmatory trials, the FDA can either grant regular approval or revoke the accelerated
approval. The FDA generally decides to revoke the accelerated approval if the additional trials
fail to provide evidence that the drug is effective for the indications for which it was approved or
fails to show that a clinical benefit justifies the risks associated with the use of the product for
that indication. Both trials failed to confirm the 5.5-month increase in progression free survival
found in the original E2100 study. AVADO showed an improvement in median progression free
survival of 0.8 months, while RIBBON1 showed an improvement in median progression free
survival of 1.2 months. Furthermore, neither study demonstrated that adding Avastin to
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chemotherapy provided a benefit to overall survival. In addition, patients in the AVADO study
self-reported that Avastin did not provide an improvement in quality of life (Decision of the
Commissioner 2011). The FDA decided to revoke Avastin’s accelerated approval because the
trials failed to demonstrate that the drug was effective and that the clinical benefits outweighed
the risks. In his final decision on the case, the Commissioner of the FDA stated: “As results from
these studies have come in, they have substantially changed the profile of this drug. AVADO and
RIBBON1 have not verified the clinical benefit shown in E2100, and considering all the
evidence, I cannot conclude that Avastin has been shown to be safe and effective for the
metastatic breast cancer indication” (Decision of the Commissioner 2011). Genetech exercised
their legal right to request a hearing, but the FDA’s Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee
(ODAC) still voted to remove the breast-cancer indication for Avastin. In a Letter to the Editor
in the New England Journal of Medicine, a member of the committee stated that he made his
decision because he did not want to hurt patients with a drug that does not work well or to
provide patients with false hope. He imagines how a hypothetical conversation would go with a
breast-cancer patient if Avastin was approved to treat metastatic breast cancer: “‘Well, I can
offer you a drug that will not make you live longer, won’t make you feel better, and may have
life-threatening side effects, but it will keep your cancer from worsening by an average of 1 to 2
months.’ Hope? Or false hope?” (Sekeres 2011).
Avastin: Evaluation of Risks vs. Benefits
Similar to their rational behind the recall of Vioxx, the FDA revoked Avastin’s
accelerated approval because they believed that the risks were not worth the benefits. The
AVADO and RIBBON1 trials failed to confirm the clinical benefit of progression free survival
for 5.5 months that was found in the first E2100 trial. Although Genetech argued that the FDA
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placed too much emphasis on the progression free survival marker and not enough on other
markers, such as hazard ratios, which were found to be in a similar range to the E2100 trial, the
FDA stood by its decision. The FDA concluded that the low progression free survival times
indicate that Avastin is not worth the risk to patients. However, some patients have made the
argument that despite Avastin’s effect on most patients, it has worked wonders for a certain
group of “super-responders” (Decision of the Commissioner 2011). They argue that the FDA
should leave Avastin on the market so that individual patients and their physicians can try the
treatment and determine if it is right for them. Furthermore, although Avastin will remain on the
market as a treatment for other types of cancers, so doctors can use it off-label for breast cancer,
insurers might no longer pay for the drug (Pollack 2011). Costing about $88,000 a year, many
women would no longer be able to afford it (Pollack 2011). Metastatic breast cancer is a death
sentence for many women. Similar to those with HIV/AIDS, the risk vs. benefit calculation
becomes very different in the face of a life-threatening disease. Patients with metastatic breast
cancer are willing to take great risks if there is a possibility of prolonging their life, even for a
few months time. They are willing to take the risk because there is a chance that they could be
one the small group of “super-responders”. For a patient facing imminent death, any chance may
be worth taking.
Final Judgment on the Avastin Decision
The FDA certainly had a difficult decision to make in the case of Avastin. While
individual anecdotes are moving, they offer the FDA no concrete evidence, which the FDA
needs to base its decision on. Additionally, “the precedent that [would] be established if the FDA
[reversed] its decision on withdrawing [Avastin’s] labeling for metastatic breast cancer not
because of changing scientific evidence, but in response to philosophical and political
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counterarguments” would hinder the agency’s credibility (Carpenter 2011). However, credibility
is a small price to pay when patients’ lives are at stake. In The New York Times, Dr. Yashar
Hirshaut, an oncologist in Manhattan, criticized the FDA for their stringent reliance on evidence,
despite the fact that patients are suffering from a life-threatening disease and already have
limited options: “Of course we want everything to be evidence-based. I also like the American
flag and apple pie. You say, ‘This person is dying right here and I need something that will help,
and there’s a logical construct that I can see how it will help.’ ” (Kolata 2008). While Avastin
was not shown to be as effective as was originally thought, the small possibility of prolonging
life, even by just a month, may be worth the risk for many persons suffering from metastatic
breast cancer. However, by failing to extend Avastin to regular approval, the FDA prevents the
majority of patients from accessing the drug because insurance companies no longer have to
cover it. The FDA should not have revoked Avastin’s accelerated approval because it is a drug
for the terminally ill. Patients diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer have few other effective
options and are likely to die from their cancer. Prolongation of life is invaluable to these patients
and their family members. The FDA must take the nature of the disease into greater account
when making their decisions. The agency should use a different standard of review when the
drug being assessed is for terminally ill patients with few or no other options.
Expedited Approval and Informed Consent
The FDA should continue to use expedited approval, provided that patients are made
clearly aware of the difference between research and treatment. Evaluations of the streamlined
approval process demonstrate that it is both economically and socially beneficial. A 2010 Project
FDA Report analyzed the use of streamlined approval for three drugs: HAART, for HIV/AIDS;
Rituxan, for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma; and Herceptin, for breast cancer. One significant social
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advantage that the research found was that the early sale of these drugs, due to the streamlined
approval process, benefited patients far more than it benefited the pharmaceutical firms that
developed them. For example, Herceptin was worth $137 billion to patients with breast cancer,
but only $9 billion in profits for the firm (Philipson 2010). Additionally, a developmental process
that allowed Herceptin to enter the market one year earlier would have increased the benefit to
patients by $8 billion, a 6% increase (Philipsion 2010). Researchers calculated these economic
values by using a “willingness to pay” (WTP) model. WTP is influenced by a patient’s income,
the year in which the disease began and the survival benefits conferred by the drug (Philipson
2010). It is used to calculate the gross value to the patient of the access to the drug in any
particular year, and then the net benefit is determined by subtracting the cost of drug itself
(Philipson 2010). The streamlined approval process is beneficial to patients and therefore should
be utilized, especially for terminally ill patients.
However, if patients are not clearly informed about the fact that they are receiving an
experimental drug for the purpose of research and not a guaranteed treatment, the expedited
approval process and clinical trial research itself becomes unethical. Dr. Passamani, who argues
that clinical trial research is the most effective and ethical way to evaluate and overcome
incomplete information about a treatment, also realizes that “physicians and their patients must
be clear about the vast gulf separating promising and proved therapies” (Passamani 1991). If
patients are led to believe they are receiving a proven treatment, the trial consequently becomes
unethical. For terminally ill patients, who have no other treatment options except to enroll in a
clinical trial, this distinction becomes even more crucial. Being a research subject is not the same
as being a patient receiving treatment. While the experimental drug might work, there is also the
chance that it may not. The most effective way to guarantee that patients are clearly informed is
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through a comprehensive informed consent process. Under current FDA regulations, “no
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by these regulations
unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the
subject's legally authorized representative” (21CFR50 2012). Informed consent is an important
and necessary part of the clinical trial research process because human subjects are donating their
time and bodies for the sake of medical knowledge.
An article in the New England Journal of Medicine suggests a counter argument, that the
obligation to obtain specific informed consent for research should not be absolute, but should
“depend on the risk–benefit ratios of the intervention and the alternatives, as well as the degree
to which the patient would be expected to have preferences about the various options for
diagnosis or treatment that are under investigation” (Truog 1999) The article argues that in
certain circumstances a general agreement to participate in research should be used in place of
the stringent protocol for informed consent outlined by FDA regulations because the requirement
to obtain informed consent in all clinical research trials is an unnecessary roadblock that prevents
the easy evaluation of new forms of technology and new interventions (Truog 1999). This
argument is flawed because a therapeutic misconception of clinical research exists in our society.
Coined by Paul Appelbaum in 1982, the phrase ‘therapeutic misconception’ describes patients’
“failure to appreciate the difference between research and treatment” (. Many patients wrongly
believe that they will be receiving treatment when they agree to participate in a trial, but this is
not the case. In many cases, they may just be receiving a placebo, or the experimental drug could
harm them more than help them. There are risks associated with any treatment, even those that
have been proven safe and effective. However, I argue that patients need and deserve a
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comprehensive informed consent process in order to help them properly understand and evaluate
the risks of participating in medical research.
Conclusion
The case studies of Vioxx and Avastin highlight several of the ethical and practical issues
of the drug approval process, including the nature of clinical trial research, the risk-benefit
analysis of new treatments, Contract Research Organizations (CROs) and the ethics of postmarketing research. However, they also reveal the fact that no drug approval process is perfect.
Regulations guiding the drug approval process are subject to historical context, public opinion
and special interests, just like any government policy. They can and do change overtime, but they
will always be criticized by any given subset of the population. Additionally, drugs react
differently depending upon the environmental factors that the person is experiencing and the
internal conditions that vary from person to person. Regardless of what the FDA decides, it will
never please everyone. However, I advocate that the FDA should take a patient centered
approach to the drug approval process. First, the FDA should continue to use accelerated
approval and work to streamline the approval process further, since it has been shown to benefit
patients greatly. Second, the agency should continue to utilize the comprehensive informed
consent process. If in the future they can eliminate the therapeutic misconception about research,
by better educating patients about the difference between research and treatment, only then
would I advocate for streamlining or removing the informed consent process. Until then, patients
need to be made fully aware of their role as a research subject. Although the FDA will always be
blamed and criticized, if they use streamlined approval and informed consent, at least they will
have the patients’ best interest at heart.
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